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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
T
he question of how many legal immigrants should be ad-
mitted to the United States—and what level of skills these 
immigrants should have—is among the most divisive issues 
in the current U.S. domestic policy landscape. Much of 
the controversy that it sparks can be traced to a single question: Do 
immigrants help or harm the economy?
Now, with a new Congress likely to take up immigration reform and 
an administration that has signaled support for a more expansive im-
migration policy—even to the point of facilitating legal status for cur-
rent illegal immigrants—the answer to this question is especially vital.
This paper reviews scholarly literature and examines government 
data on immigration’s contribution to economic growth and finds 
that both high- and low-skill immigration, on net, boosts economic 
growth. The paper concludes with a series of pro-growth, long-term 
policy reforms that Congress would do well to include in immigra-
tion reform legislation. (This is not to imply an endorsement of the 
granting of legal status to nonlegal immigrants by executive action, as 
pledged by the White House at the time of the release of this report.)
Immigration spurs economic growth in two ways. First, it expands 
America’s workforce and encourages more business start-ups. Second, 
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under two-thirds of 1 percent (0.637 percent) of the 
U.S. labor force in 2013, down from 1.4 percent of 
the labor force in 1991.3
In 2013, Caribbean, Central American, and South 
American immigrants combined were equivalent to 
a fraction of 1 percent (0.16 percent) of the labor 
force. Even Mexican immigrants accounted for less 
than one-tenth of 1 percent (0.086 percent) of the 
labor force.4
America’s foreign-born population has stayed largely 
flat since the late 2000s. Foreign-born workers of 
Hispanic origin, including undocumented workers, 
made up 7.8 percent of the labor force in 2013.5 
Meanwhile, the estimated number of undocumented 
workers in the U.S. has declined since 2007.
Each year, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) accepts applications for H-1B 
visas—of which 65,000 H-1B temporary visas are is-
sued to skilled workers certified by the Labor Depart-
ment and 20,000 H-1B visas are issued to those with 
U.S.-awarded master’s degrees.6 In addition, some 
companies acquire three-year extensions on previous 
visa renewals. Nonprofits and institutions of higher 
education are exempt from the visa cap, so workers at 
such places also receive visas. In 2013, USCIS issued 
153,000 new or extended H-1B visas.7
Demand for foreign labor far outstrips the supply of 
H-1B visas. Visa applications can be filed on April 1 
of each year. In 2014, the cap was reached on April 
7.8 In 1999, Congress temporarily raised the quota 
to 115,000, and again to 195,000 in 2001, with 
neither raise exceeding demand. In 2004, the quota 
nevertheless reverted to 65,000 (plus 20,000 awarded 
to recipients of U.S. advanced degrees).9
H-1B hires cannot displace U.S. workers for 90 days 
before and after the application is filed if their em-
ployer is not H-1B-dependent—and for 180 days be-
fore and after if their employer is H-1B-dependent.10 
The employer must also prove to the Department of 
Labor that qualified local workers are unavailable at 
because immigrants’ educational backgrounds typi-
cally complement, rather than displace, the skills of 
the native-born labor market, immigration increases 
economic efficiency by supplying more labor to low- 
and high-skill markets.
Today, the share of immigrants in the U.S. workforce has 
declined to below its 1991 peak. H-1B temporary visas 
for new, skilled immigrant workers fail to meet demand: 
the current quota, limited at 85,000 annually, represents 
just over one-twentieth of 1 percent of the U.S. labor 
force. Acquiring permanent residency (a “green card”) is 
a lengthy, costly process. When immigrant talent, such 
as the 51 percent of foreign-born engineering doctorate 
earners and 44 percent of foreign-born physics doctor-
ate earners,1 are forced to leave the country, private and 
taxpayer investment in research loses value.
Such harmful consequences are the result of opposi-
tion to more open immigration. And while some 
arguments against more immigration are rooted 
in preserving American cultural norms, others are 
based on economics. Failure to fully account for the 
economic benefits of immigration, which, on net—as 
this paper documents—outweigh its costs, is respon-
sible for many of the specious economic arguments 
espoused by immigration’s critics.
Legislation is needed to expand the number of visas 
for both low- and high-skill immigrants and to begin 
to resolve the status of the estimated 11 million illegal 
workers living in the United States. Labor markets 
change constantly; U.S. immigration policy should 
emulate this flexibility. Above all, the data are clear: more 
flexible immigration policies spur growth and would 
benefit all Americans, native- and foreign-born alike.
I. IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.: 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Recently, U.S. immigration levels have fallen as mi-
grant inflows have declined in relative terms. Annual 
immigration from all countries has dropped, since 
peaking at 1.8 million green card recipients in 1991; 
in 2013, it stood at 990,500.2 Immigration was just 
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market wages and must commit to paying at least the 
average local wage for H-1B hires.
After receiving an H-1B visa, the next step for po-
tential immigrants is to obtain permanent residency 
through the employment-based green card program. 
Government data show that of the 990,500 awarded 
green cards in 2013, 21,000 went to new arrivals 
sponsored by an employer and 140,000 went to cur-
rent residents sponsored by an employer. Of these, 
about 1,300 were low-skill workers.11
Regulatory stipulations for temporary workers are less 
burdensome but still require extensive documentation 
and cost. Applications for “national interest waiver-
based permanent residency visas” can take an entire 
month to complete and cost $6,000 in legal fees 
and $1,000 in application fees. For people seeking 
permanent residency, the process can take years or 
even decades.
II. THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
CONSENSUS: A SNAPSHOT
With different immigration paths available for work-
ers based on type of work performed, the economic 
effects of immigration need to be evaluated for both 
high- and low-skill workers. Numerous empirical 
studies have been published on this issue (see Bibliog-
raphy), with recent government data only reinforcing 
the overall academic consensus that increased immi-
gration leads to higher economic growth.
Research by Giovanni Peri of the University of Califor-
nia at Davis, for example, documents how expanding 
legal immigration would create “growth, innovation, 
and labor market efficiency and flexibility,” leading to 
a “substantial economic stimulus [for the U.S.].”12 Peri, 
together with Gianmarco Ottaviano of the London 
School of Economics, has published extensively on 
how the skills of immigrants often complement those 
displayed by the existing U.S. labor force.13
Immigrants make the economy more efficient by 
increasing the supply of labor, both in high- and 
low-skill areas, creating jobs for native-born Ameri-
cans in the process: a 2010 research paper by Peri, 
with Chad Sparber of Colgate University, concluded 
that—contrary to popular wisdom—immigrants do 
not, in fact, displace native workers.14
Statistically, the average skills of native-born Ameri-
can workers are distributed in a bell-shaped curve: 
many Americans, as mentioned, hold high school 
diplomas and have earned college credits, while 
relatively few adults lack high school diplomas and 
even fewer possess Ph.D.s in math and science. 
Immigrants’ skills, in contrast, are distributed in a 
U-shaped curve: disproportionate numbers of adults 
without high school diplomas seeking manual work 
are coupled with highly skilled workers holding math 
and science Ph.D.s. (Research conducted in 2012 
by Rutgers University’s Jennifer Hunt found that 
immigration increases the probability that natives 
will complete high school, reinforcing such skill 
complementarities.)15
Immigrants are especially vital in the STEM (sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and mathematics) 
fields. Since 1995, the majority of the net increase 
in America’s STEM workforce is attributable to 
immigrants, according to a 2008 Harvard Business 
School paper.16 Indeed, the presence of foreign stu-
dents in U.S. science and engineering departments 
is responsible for a significant increase in research 
productivity:17 a one-percentage-point increase 
in immigrant scientists and engineers raises the 
number of patents per capita by 9–18 percent, con-
cluded Hunt and Princeton University’s Marjolaine 
Gauthier-Loiselle.18
Arlene Holen of the Technology Policy Institute, using 
methodology from the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), estimates that in the absence of constraints on 
green card and H-1B visas over the 2003–07 period, 
an additional 182,000 foreign graduates in STEM 
fields would have remained in the United States. In 
2008 alone, their earnings and contribution to GDP 
would have amounted to $14 billion, with $2.7 bil-
lion–$3.6 billion paid in taxes.25
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In the absence of visa constraints over the 2003–07 
period, about 300,000 H-1B visa holders would likely 
have remained in the U.S. labor force rather than 
returning to their home countries. Holen estimates 
that such individuals would have earned $23 billion 
in 2008, generating $4.5 billion–$6.2 billion in tax 
revenue that year—and contributing $34 billion–$47 
billion to government coffers over the next decade.26
Likewise, Holen finds that proposals considered by 
Congress five years ago to loosen green card and 
temporary work constraints for high-skill workers 
would reduce the federal budget deficit by around 
$100 billion over ten years.27 The CBO and Joint 
Tax Committee reached similar conclusions in 2013, 
estimating that legislation that expands the labor force 
through immigration would result in a $459 billion 
increase in federal revenue over ten years, while trim-
ming the federal deficit by $197 billion.28
III. WHY DOES IMMIGRATION INCREASE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH?
The most important way immigrants benefit the 
U.S. economy, according to academic literature, is 
their possession of different skills and job prefer-
ences from those displayed by native-born Ameri-
cans, thereby making the latter more productive. 
As a result, immigrants complement rather than 
substitute for native-born workers, with capital 
moving accordingly to maximize available labor.29
Although immigrants will no doubt be substi-
tutes for some primarily low-skill workers (many 
themselves immigrants), the negative effects expe-
rienced by such workers are far smaller than the 
positive effects enjoyed by everyone else. In short, 
the economy as a whole gains, with considerably 
more winners than losers. (In certain cases, enacting 
On one end of the spectrum, 91 percent of native-born Americans hold high school diplo-
mas or higher, whereas only 62 percent of noncitizens do.19 Immigrants account for about 16 
percent of the U.S. labor force, with 24.3 percent of workers who are foreign-born and over 
the age of 25 not completing high school, compared with merely 4.8 percent of native-born 
workers.20
 On the other end of the spectrum, 56 percent of engineering doctoral degrees, 51 percent 
of computer science doctoral degrees, and 44 percent of physics doctoral degrees were awarded 
in 2011 to students who were neither U.S. citizens nor permanent residents.21 National Science 
Foundation data show that 163,000 foreign graduate students studied science and engineering 
in U.S. universities in 2010, up from 152,000 in 2008.22 
 Immigrants benefit from, and disproportionately contribute to, U.S. STEM research. 
Many universities rely on graduate students for research assistance and technical expertise, with 
government research funding training graduate students in the latest technologies. Most re-
search, moreover, does not require security clearances—and little, if any, research is restricted to 
American students.
 In 2011 (the most recent year for which data are available), the federal government spent 
over $58 billion on science and engineering research at American universities and research in-
stitutions.23 This funding helps finance Ph.D. programs, which are heavily populated by foreign 
students. (More than $31 billion of this research spending was dispensed by the Department 
of Health and Human Services; other funders include the Defense Department, at $6.6 billion; 
and the Department of Energy, at $6.8 billion).24
EDUCATION QUALIFICATIONS: IMMIGRANTS VS. NATIVE-BORN AMERICANS
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policy measures to compensate displaced workers 
might be considered, too.)
Immigrants and Native-Born Americans 
Pursue Different Careers
Low-skill immigrants are disproportionately repre-
sented in the service, construction, and agricultural 
sectors—prominent in occupations such as jani-
tors, landscapers, tailors, plasterers, stucco masons, 
and farmworkers. Government, education, health, 
and social services are sectors that employ few im-
migrants.
Low-skill immigrants favor certain jobs (fruit pick-
ers, housekeepers, etc.) that native-born Americans 
typically do not choose as careers. At the same 
time, immigrants are rarely found in other low-
skill jobs (crossing guards, funeral service workers, 
etc.) preferred by low-skill Americans. Similarly, 
high-skill immigrants tend to prefer certain types 
of high-skill occupations (research scientists, 
dentists, computer engineers, etc.) and are less 
prominent in other high-skill fields (lawyers, 
judges, education administrators, etc.) favored by 
high-skill Americans.
Figure 1 offers a broad overview of foreign and 
native-born workers as a share of various occupa-
tions; Figure 2 provides a more detailed breakdown 
by profession.
In the professional fields, as Figure 2 documents, 
foreign-born workers are employed in computer 
and mathematical jobs at a higher rate than native-
born workers (3.9 percent versus 2.5 percent). 
Native-born workers are more than twice as likely 
as immigrants to be employed in legal occupations 
(1.4 percent versus 0.6 percent). American-born 
workers are far more likely to work in education, 
training, and library occupations (6.5 percent versus 
3.4 percent).
Yet in service-oriented fields, such as food service (7.7 
percent versus 5.3 percent) and building, grounds 
cleaning, and maintenance (8.6 percent versus 3.0 
percent), immigrants significantly outnumber native-
born Americans. Immigrants are also prominent in 
advanced scientific research (see box, page 4, “Edu-
cation Qualifications: Immigrants vs. Native-Born 
Americans”). Between 1901 and 2014, over one-third 
of U.S. Nobel Prize winners in physiology and medi-
cine were foreign-born.30
For another important example of how immigration 
confers substantial economic benefits on native-born 
Americans, consider the role of foreigners in start-ups. 
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FIGURE 1. NATIVE-BORN AND FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS 
AS SHARE OF OCCUPATIONS, 2013
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Immigrants are disproportionately entrepreneurial, 
boosting tax revenue and creating more jobs for 
Americans, according to Tim Bolin of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley.31 Some 44 percent of 
high-tech Silicon Valley businesses had at least one 
immigrant founder.32 In 2012, U.S. engineering 
and technology firms founded by immigrants in the 
2006–12 period employed approximately 560,000 
workers, generating $63 billion in sales.33
IV. RECENT EMPIRICAL OBJECTIONS 
TO THE GROWTH CONCLUSION: 
CAMAROTA AND ZEIGLER
In an important 2014 paper, Steven Camarota and 
Karen Zeigler, of the Center for Immigration Stud-
ies, examined New Hampshire’s working-age labor 
market since 2000.34 Using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey data, 
Occupation Foreign-born Native-born
Total employed 100 100
Management, professional, and related 30.3 39.5
    Management, business, and financial operations 11.7 16.6
        Management 8.0 11.8
        Business and financial operations 3.7 4.9
    Professional and related 18.6 22.9
        Computer and mathematical 3.9 2.5
        Architecture and engineering 2.2 1.9
        Life, physical, and social science 1.1 0.9
        Community and social service 0.8 1.8
        Legal 0.6 1.4
        Education, training, and library 3.4 6.5
        Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media 1.3 2.1
        Healthcare practitioner and technical 5.2 5.8
Service 24.8 16.7
    Healthcare support 2.7 2.4
    Protective service 1.0 2.4
    Food preparation and serving related 7.7 5.3
    Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 8.6 3.0
    Personal care and service 4.8 3.5
Sales and office 16.5 24.4
    Sales and related 8.5 11.2
    Office and administrative support 8.0 13.2
Natural resources, construction, and maintenance 12.9 8.3
    Farming, fishing, and forestry 1.6 0.5
    Construction and extraction 8.3 4.3
    Installation, maintenance, and repair 3.1 3.5
Production, transportation, and material moving 15.4 11.1
    Production 8.3 5.2
    Transportation and material moving 7.1 5.8
FIGURE 2. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN-BORN AND 
NATIVE-BORN WORKERS, 16+, BY OCCUPATION, 2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—2013,” May 2014, 
Table 4, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf 
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they found that 71 percent of the state’s net increase 
in employment among working-age people went to 
immigrants—despite the fact that native-born Ameri-
cans accounted for 65 percent of the growth in New 
Hampshire’s working-age population over the period.
The authors conclude that immigration leads to less 
work for native-born Americans. Their findings are 
all the more remarkable because they contradict the 
overwhelming body of empirical evidence, discussed 
in Section III, that more immigration would boost 
economic growth in the U.S. (Admittedly, economists 
are less united on the question of the extent to which 
growth would increase as a result of more immigra-
tion.) Camarota and Zeigler’s paper therefore merits 
close scrutiny.
Errors and Omissions
Among others flaws, Camarota and Zeigler fail to ac-
count for the closely connected New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts labor markets. The number of New 
Hampshire residents who work in Massachusetts has 
grown significantly in the past decade. This trend has 
not, however, snatched employment opportunities 
away from natives in the more localized New Hamp-
shire labor market but rather brought preexisting 
employment and incomes into the state.
Oddly, too, Camarota and Zeigler count Massachu-
setts workers who move to New Hampshire as “im-
migrants,” as part of their 21,000-person figure of 
the number of employed immigrants living in New 
Hampshire. The authors compare this figure with 
the 8,700 increase in native-born employed persons 
living in New Hampshire and then cite an increase of 
41,000 “non-working” native-born New Hampshire 
residents between 2000 and 2014—arguing that 
the growth of immigrant employment came at the 
expense of native employment.
Camarota and Ziegler also conflate the number of na-
tives “not employed” with the number of unemployed. 
Most of the “not employed” are, in fact, not in the 
labor force (i.e., not actively seeking work): retired 
individuals, the disabled, students, and nonworking 
spouses, among others. The 41,000 “not employed” 
figure cited by Camarota and Ziegler consequently 
overstates, by nearly four times, the increase in New 
Hampshire’s truly unemployed.
While the number of unemployed native-born resi-
dents did increase by 11,786 between 2000 and 2014, 
the data reported by Camarota and Ziegler show that 
86 percent of the increase (10,114) was attributable 
to individuals without a four-year college degree. In 
other words, to justify their argument that immigrant 
employment growth impinged on native employment 
opportunities, the authors would need to compare 
educational attainment and occupations of the im-
migrant employment growth cohort with those of the 
native unemployment change cohort. (Such analysis 
could have been—but was not—conducted from CPS 
data used by the authors.)
The authors also ignore the general recent trend of 
working-age people dropping out of the labor force, 
a trend especially pronounced among non-college-
educated native-born Americans. (Over the period 
studied, U.S. working-age labor-force participation 
fell by more than three percentage points, from 84.0 
percent in 2000 to 80.8 percent in October 2014.)35 
Indeed, while declining labor-force participation 
rates certainly are cause for concern, they are not a 
symptom of too much immigration but are instead the 
product of both a changing economy and government 
policies that create disincentives to work.
Further Flaws
When Camarota and Ziegler claim that there is no 
net labor shortage, as seen in the number of people 
unemployed and outside the labor force, they improp-
erly combine all occupations and skill levels into one 
category: “The long-term decline in employment for 
natives in New Hampshire and the large number of 
working-age natives not working clearly indicates that 
there is no general labor shortage in the state—espe-
cially among the less educated. Thus it is very difficult 
to justify the large increases in foreign workers (skilled 
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and unskilled) allowed into the country in a bill like 
S.744 [the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013].”36
Yet labor is not homogeneous—surpluses can exist for 
some occupations alongside shortages for others. As 
Current Population Survey data show (the same used 
by the authors), immigrants select different occupa-
tions from those of natives. In addition, Camarota 
and Ziegler ignore the U-shape distribution of immi-
grants’ education, incorrectly assuming that low-skill 
immigrants compete with low-skill Americans. (In 
reality, superior English language skills usually make 
low-skill Americans relatively more skilled than their 
immigrant counterparts.)
Nor is it likely that most undocumented immigrants 
compete with American high school graduates for 
jobs. Undocumented immigrants tend to work in 
jobs that do not require interaction with customers, 
such as dishwashing, lawn care, and house care. (If 
anything, low-skill immigrants might displace high 
school dropouts, but as BLS data show, this group 
has seen increased labor-force participation since 
2000.)37 On the other hand, Americans with high 
school degrees usually have the skills to find work in 
service and sales jobs: Camarota and Ziegler fail to 
demonstrate that there are native job seekers available 
to take those jobs (whether high- or low-skill) where 
immigrant employment increased.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
President Obama’s televised pledge to change immi-
gration law via executive order unleashed predictable 
fury from the GOP. Still, members of the incoming 
Congress will likely take some action toward re-
forming the country’s immigration system in 2015. 
What should bipartisan reform prioritize? S.744, the 
stalled 2013 Senate immigration bill, offers a useful 
starting point.
Flexibility should be the guiding immigration reform 
principle. Labor markets are constantly changing, and 
U.S. immigration policy needs to acknowledge this 
reality. The current number of H-1B visas (85,000) 
represents a small fraction of the U.S. labor force 
of 155 million.38 Even if the quota were raised to 
150,000 annually when employment growth picks 
up, that would represent less than one-tenth of 1 
percent of the labor force—while continuing to block 
admission to the vast majority of would-be entrants.
Not only does demand far exceed supply for H-1B vi-
sas; the process’s notable complexity and cost discourage 
applicants as well. In addition, recipients are tied to one 
PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS
Most recent immigration reform proposals, such as the 2005–07 McCain-Kennedy immigration 
bills and S.744, would both allow more immigrants into the U.S. and offer many of America’s 
12 million illegal immigrants a path to legal status.
       Under such proposals, illegal immigrants without criminal records would—after completing 
steps including payment of back taxes and fines, as well as passing background checks and a civics 
test—be eligible for work permits. Later, they would be allowed to join the back of the line to 
obtain green cards and, eventually, citizenship.
        For low-skill agricultural laborers and others who have worked in the U.S. for years and 
paid no taxes, the requirement to immediately fulfill such tax obligations and accompanying fines 
could present a high hurdle, discouraging legalization. Future reforms would therefore do well 
to cap tax payments or allow payments over a longer period of time (perhaps while imposing a 
higher Social Security tax rate).
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employer, opening the door for abuse and artificially 
low compensation (while potentially undercutting 
U.S. residents and citizens). Rather than expand the 
number of H-1B visas, Congress should instead issue 
more green cards, allowing recipients to change jobs 
and move to where their skills are most valued.
One possible solution—included in S.744—would be 
to grant green cards to immigrant entrepreneurs who 
do one of the following: raise more than $100,000 
in accredited investment in their businesses; create at 
least three qualified jobs in the previous two years; or 
own businesses earning over $250,000 in annual rev-
enue.39 The benefit to the economy of this approach 
is clear: keep flourishing businesses, along with the 
entrepreneurs who lead them, in the U.S.
Likewise, issuing green cards to those who invest and 
maintain at least $500,000 in residential real estate 
would positively affect the U.S. housing market, 
economy at large, and tax revenue; Canada, for one, 
has adopted a similar policy to considerable benefit.40 
Needless to say, the risk of such wealthy immigrants 
someday requiring social assistance is low.
Expand the Pie
Some immigration critics fret that offering visas to 
foreign high-skill workers, such as physicists and 
engineers, denies opportunity to native-born aspiring 
physicists and engineers.41 Such fears could not be 
further from reality: additional high-skill jobs expand 
the economic pie.
The same holds true at the low end of the skill scale. 
Farms provide income to farmers, as well as to other 
native-born Americans employed in the industry 
in trucking and distribution. If farmers cannot hire 
low-skill immigrants to pick fruit (the case for Wash-
ington State’s 2012 apple crop), U.S. agriculture will 
increasingly migrate offshore to places where low-skill 
labor is plentiful.42 (Many Americans may not care 
where their food comes from, of course, but American 
farmers surely prefer that consumers buy local rather 
than imported produce.) Legalizing undocumented 
agricultural workers would do much for the cause of 
more flexible, efficient U.S. labor markets, allowing 
such workers to freely travel and work outside the 
U.S. without losing their status, vital in the seasonal 
agriculture industry.
More generally, making it easier for foreign-born stu-
dents and workers to obtain provisional visas to stay 
and work in the U.S., visas that could later transition 
into green cards, would facilitate faster GDP growth 
and job creation across the entire economy. At present, 
however, only 10 percent of green cards authorizing 
permanent residence—and a path to citizenship—are 
granted for employment purposes.43
Indeed, for many immigrants, such as those from 
India, the wait for American green cards can extend 
decades. And since green cards bring in few workers, 
most skilled workers resort to precarious temporary 
visas. At the same time, far more work visas are needed 
for unskilled workers, who enjoy few alternatives to 
illegal immigration.
Nor should the positive economic role of family-based 
immigration be overlooked. Families provide vital 
support networks, including job introductions and 
child-care support. At present, in fact, more green 
cards are awarded to immigrants’ family members 
than to individual applicants.44 
Two Reforms to Avoid
Under well-crafted immigration reform, immigrants 
on work permits would not qualify for federal public 
benefits (food stamps, free school lunches, Affordable 
Care Act health insurance subsidies, etc.). By creating 
such conditions, immigrants would undeniably come 
to work or to support working family members, not 
to live off government assistance.
Immigration reform should also avoid government 
wage-setting provisions (artificially raising the cost of 
labor), which tempt firms to continue hiring illegal 
workers while creating other labor market distor-
tions, too.45
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Seven years after the start of the Great Recession in 
December 2007, the U.S. economy can boast only 
1.3 million more jobs now than it enjoyed then. 
GDP growth hovers around 2 percent, well below the 
country’s long-term 3 percent average. Labor-force 
participation has dipped below 63 percent (equal to 
1978 levels, before the entry of 12 million women 
into the workforce during the 1980s).
Increased immigration, from both high- and low-skill 
workers, would revitalize the U.S. labor market by 
spurring entrepreneurial activity and correcting labor-
market inefficiencies. At a time when Americans worry 
about their country’s international competitiveness, a 
more vibrant domestic labor market is sorely needed.
Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution estimates 
that the U.S. economy generates about 15 new com-
panies annually that will, eventually, produce a billion 
dollars or more in annual revenue. Legal and regula-
tory reform, adds Litan, could increase that number 
to 60 such new companies, raising GDP growth by 
more than a full percentage point. (With GDP growth 
of 4 percent, the economy would double in 18 years, 
dramatically raising real incomes.)46
New companies in their first few years of existence, 
data also show, hire substantial numbers of workers.47 
It is also true that immigrants to the U.S. found 
new companies at greater rates than do native-born 
Americans.48 Silicon Valley, one famous example 
of the flowering of high-skill immigrant entrepre-
neurship, has seen its share of immigrant-founded 
companies decline sharply, from 52 percent between 
1995 and 2005 to 44 percent from 2006 to 2012.49 
Among other negative consequences, Congress—by 
making it difficult for high-skill workers, many 
educated at top U.S. universities, to remain in the 
country—is eroding the value that America receives 
from private and taxpayers’ investments in research.
Land of Opportunity
Despite the U.S. welfare state’s dramatic expansion 
over the past 80 years, immigrants continue to flock 
to America primarily to seize the economic opportu-
nity that the nation still offers. Since 1999, the gap 
in labor-force participation rates between immigrants 
and native-born Americans has widened steadily as 
well: in 2013, 66.4 percent of immigrants were work-
ing or seeking work, compared with 62.7 percent of 
native-born Americans.50
U.S. immigration policy should aim to spur economic 
growth, not hinder it. At its core, this requires find-
ing better ways to allow people who wish to work 
in the U.S. and contribute to its economy to come 
legally—through legislation passed by Congress, not 
decreed by the president. Since immigrants’ skills 
tend to complement those of native-born Americans, 
such reforms would, as this paper has discussed, not 
only enhance the efficiency of the U.S. economy, 
boosting growth; these reforms would, on net, create 
significantly more jobs for native-born Americans 
than under the status quo.51
Immigration has always been a part of American 
life, usually for the better. Indeed, the U.S. was 
founded, and has flourished like few others, largely 
on the backs of immigrants and their descendants. 
A large body of economic literature and government 
data, of which this paper offers a snapshot, leaves 
little doubt that immigration is not the cause of the 
country’s current economic woes—but is rather part 
of the cure to the faster economic growth that the 
U.S. urgently needs.
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